[This Article has been authored by Tanu Mehta, a 2nd Year B.A. LL.B. student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar.]

Introduction

On 5^th February 2026, the Supreme Court addressed an interesting intersection relating to the personal laws and criminal laws in the context of rape allegations based on the false promise of marriage in Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.  The case examined whether an unenforceable promise of marriage has the power to vitiate consent under Section 376(2)(n) IPC (Now Section 64 BNS). The judgment also distinguishes between consensual relationships turning acrimonious and genuine cases of sexual assault. 

Facts

The complainant was a 33-year old advocate who got married in the year 2011 and gave birth to a son in the year 2012. After a few years, due to some matrimonial discord between the couple, the husband filed for a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Subsequently, the divorce petition was dismissed by the Family Court. After which an appeal by the husband of the complainant followed. It  remains pending to this day before the Chhattisgarh High Court. Consequently, at the time of the adjudication of the present case, the complainant remained legally married throughout the relevant period. On 18^th September 2022, the complainant met the accused who is also an advocate, at a social event where they subsequently developed mutual fondness and from then on maintained regular contact. The complainant informed the accused about her pending divorce proceedings during their initial meetings. According to the FIR lodged under Section 376(2)(n) IPC (Now Section 64 BNS), the accused allegedly raped the complainant repeatedly on false promises of marriage. She claimed that he applied vermilion on her head, continued physical relations while assuring her of marriage, impregnated her, and subsequently forced her to abort the pregnancy while turning evasive about marriage. Simultaneously, the accused filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the FIR. HC dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the investigation is still at a nascent stage and it cannot be said that no prime facie offence has been made out. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the accused filed a   SLP before the Supreme Court.  

Issues Raised

(i) Whether a promise of marriage that cannot be legally fulfilled due to the complainant’s existing marital status can form the basis for rape charges;

(ii) The interpretation of the word “repeatedly” under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and whether the facts disclosed such repeated acts;

(iii) Whether the complainant’s consent was genuinely vitiated by the false promise, given her legal incapacity to marry and existing professional knowledge as an advocate.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The reasoning of the SC was grounded on the interplay between the personal laws and criminal law. The court emphasized that Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, prohibits marriage between individuals if either of them has a living spouse, which is known as bigamy. Since the complainant remained legally married throughout the alleged period, any promise of marriage was legally unenforceable and incapable of being acted upon. The court opined that Section 376(2)(n) of IPC provides for enhanced punishment in the cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the same woman. The word “repeatedly” is of great significance because it reflects more than one act of sexual assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim. The Court differentiated a single continuous act, vs a series of acts that are separate in nature with unmistakable elements of fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation. Therefore, no offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC was made out, because there existed an express prohibition by the personal law before criminal law could come into play. 

Analysis & Conclusion

This judgment is a step towards understanding of the relationship between Personal and Criminal Laws. This case has an important precedential value, wherein a person’s legal capacity to marry is questioned as a requirement for rape allegations based on false marriage promises. This abuse of law can be seen in a plethora of cases in today’s time and can hence be prevented.  

The judgment however, does raise some concerns with regards to the possibility of some categorical exclusions. The emphasis on the complainant’s professional status and education, implies that educated women are not the ones who can be deceived, and will be given a benefit of doubt. The court noted that the complainant “should have used her prudence and discretion” before enmeshing herself in the State apparatus and “taking the path of victimisation”. Meanwhile, the interpretation of the meaning of the word “repeatedly” in Section 376(2)(n) IPC (Now Section 64 BNS) is valuable. It separates out the real cases of fear, pressure or captivity from the continued consensual relationships that would then prevent the dilution of aggravated rape provisions.